Religious Racism. Islamophobia and Antisemitism in Italian Society by Alfredo, Alietti & Padovan, Dario






Religious Racism. Islamophobia and Antisemitism in  
Italian Society 
Alfredo Alietti 1 and Dario Padovan 2,* 
1 Department of Humanities Studies, University of Ferrara, via Paradiso 12, Ferrara 44121, Italy;  
E-Mail: ala@unife.it 
2 Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Torino, Campus Luigi Einaudi Lungo 
Dora Siena 100, Torino 10153, Italy 
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: dario.padovan@unito.it;  
Tel.: 00390116702604. 
Received: 15 July 2013; in revised form: 15 November 2013 / Accepted: 20 November 2013 /  
Published: 26 November 2013 
 
Abstract: Racism and racial prejudice, considered a relic of obsolete and outdated social 
systems, is emerging in the depths of ultra-modern Western societies with different 
characteristics from the past but with a surprising and worrying virulence. These waves of 
prejudice and racism testify to the many fears that fill the horizons of advanced societies, 
undermining not only their internal reliability, but also just their democratic settings. This 
paper presents a critical review of Islamophobia as a racial prejudice, showing that two 
main definitions are at work: Islamophobia as xeno-racism or linked to the so-called clash 
of civilizations. Then, it presents the outcomes coming from a Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interview (CATI) survey led among a representative sample of the Italian 
population (n = 1,523) on Antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes. The cogency and 
structure of anti-Muslim public discourse and connected mass attitudes, revealed by our 
investigation, confirm the emergency of these two relevant dimensions of Islamophobia, 
which claim for a more accurate definition of Islamophobia. Moreover, the distribution of 
anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attitudes illustrate an interesting overlapping of 
Islamophobia and Antisemitism which claims that racism is multi-targeted and that there is 
not so much options between Antisemitism and Islamophobia. Finally, we use three main 
variables—anomie, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism—as predictors of Islamophobia 
and Antisemitism. We tested the strength of these three predictors with the aid of path 
technique based on multiple regression analysis, which helps to determine the direct and 
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indirect impacts of certain independent variables on dependent variables in a hypothetical 
causal system. 
Keywords: Islamophobia; Antisemitism; racism; ethnocentrism; Authoritarism 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite what is claimed by fans of neoliberal globalization, societies have not moved to a state of 
deep and widespread prosperity, free from conflict, hostility, exclusion, and discrimination. Racism 
and racial prejudice, considered a relic of obsolete and outdated social systems, is emerging in the 
depths of ultra-modern Western societies with different characteristics from the past but with a 
surprising and worrying virulence. They testify to the many fears that fill the horizons of adva nced 
societies, undermining not only the internal reliability, but also just their democratic settings. For ms of 
racial prejudice, such as Antisemitism, reappear in unexpected forms, presenting new and unpredicted 
characteristics, whereas Islamophobia seems to challenge, by diffusion, transversality, and essentiality, 
the worst historical anti-Semitic exhibitions of early twentieth century. These waves of racial prejudice 
that are passing through all Western countries seem to tackle more with cultural and religious signs of 
otherness than with differences inscribed upon bodi ly traits. This is the reason why some scholar 
speaks of “religious-driven hatred and hos tility” [1].  
The endeavour of this research is to understand the nature of these new cultural and religious 
racisms, which are irresistibly growing up inside Western societies. In the paper we will use different 
terms and concepts—such as prejudice, racism, hostility, intolerance, discrimination, and so on—to 
which we give, for now, similar and interchangeable meaning. We realize that the logics of racism are 
not easy understandable, but the reasoned choice of appropriate theoretical vocabulary for the 
definition of plastic, changing, elusive phenomena such as Islamophobia or Antisemitism, on which 
scholars are still questioning, may be a consequence and not a premise of researches such as that 
presented here. 
This research is based on 1528 interviewed with CATI technique (Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interview) subjects, which are a representative sample of the Italian population stratified according to 
age, gender, and residence. The questionnaire used was built by a set of scales divided according to 
areas covered by our working hypothesis, scales that are part of a well-established empirical tradition. 
Regarding the items of the scales of Antisemitism and Islamophobia, we have pursued well-beaten 
paths, especially those related to questions (items) on anti-Semitic attitudes that have reached in time a 
certain maturity and methodological validation, whereas for the anti-Muslim attitudes the situation is 
less clear and evolved [2]. To these scales we add three others scales pursuing a strategy aimed at the 
unveiling of a structured model, which takes into account some crucial attitudes of the psycho-sociological 
dynamics of prejudice. Specifically, we designed three scales aimed at the identification of these 
attitudes, respectively the authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and anomie scales. 
The frame for the reflection upon data is formed by different sections: in the second we discuss 
some aspects of the Islamophobia category, trying to identify among scholars two different and latent 
dimensions of Islamophobia, the first related to the so called xeno-racism the second to idea of clash of 
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civilizations. In the third one, we present some anti-Muslim discourses spread in Italy in recent years. 
In the fourth section we discuss on the basis of our data the two dimensions of Islamophobia while in 
the fifth we present some theoretical aspects related to the empirical overlapping of Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia. Finally, we present the racist predictors pattern we used to explain the nature of this 
new racism, its liquidity and its final and unexpected function of social bonding. 
2. Some Critical Notes on Islamophobia 
In recent literature, the prejudice against Muslims has been called Islamophobia the meaning of 
which was delineated in 1997 by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia promoted by 
Runnymede Trust [3]. The use of that category, and its variations, has not been without criticism and 
disagreement, more or less legitimate and plausible [4]. This has led us to a short reflection on the 
general concept of Islamophobia. First of all, a “phobia” is not racism. It is an attitude that is fed more 
by fears than a willingness to subordinate, racialize, and crystallize the differences and inequalities of 
the “Other”, as in the case of Antisemitism. Even though it encourages racist attitudes or practices and 
it is able to change from fear to racism, it is not by definition a racial prejudice. Islamophobia appears 
in such way as a polysemic concept, embracing too much different phenomena and with porous borders 
permeable to various kinds of interpretation. The Runnymede Trust’s large definition of Islamophobia 
risks losing a rigorous perspective of analysis [1,5]. Therefore, the term Islamophobia is to some extent 
misleading, as it refers primarily to a fear of Islam historically rooted in the Christian-Western culture 
since the time of the Crusades. As reported by Zafar Iqbal, “Islamophobia is a new word for an old 
fear”. It is a form of religious intolerance, whose manifestations can be found in historic wars, crusades 
and genocides spread long over centuries [6]. 
In reality, these deep feelings of cultural distance often overlap to broader phenomena as, for 
example, fear of immigrants or foreigners. Moreover, Islamophobia refers to a perception of threat that 
seems not thus widespread as the belief that the Muslims are instead a closed and biased group. As 
suggested by Heitmeyer and Zick [7], Islamophobia is a form of group-oriented enmity and a general 
attitude of rejection of Muslims and all religious symbols and rituals that stem from the Islam.  
This definition focuses on construction of the enemy, which implies not only a generic ‘phobia’, but a 
rational construction of a racialized other where symbols and rituals become parts of an unchangeable 
identity. Here ‘phobia’ becomes a racism, because it transforms the bearer of a perceived threat in a 
racialized ‘Other’, where there is a strong continuity between religious characters and individual 
behavior, in which it is thought  that the group exercises strong influence on individual will, where 
differences are crystallized once for all. 
Without wishing to belittle or invalidate the concept of Islamophobia as a means to highlight an 
aggressive and hostile attitudes and discourses against Muslims, we think that is possible to recognize 
two different patterns of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism: one oriented to the model of ‘internal 
enemy’ and strictly connected with the fear of the proximity of Muslim bod y [1]; the second oriented 
to a more general view of Islamic civilization as an ‘external threat’ perpetrating attacks, wars and 
invasions. In the first case we observe an Islamophobia that seems very close to the so-called cultural 
or differential racism [8,9]. The lack of phenotypic racial characters of people targeted by this cultural 
racism makes it moving towards a religious-driven racism very close to Antisemitism. As suggested by 
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Balibar [9], all the contemporary differential racism can be understood from the formal point of  
view as generalized Antisemitism. For this reason it is possible to understand the potential theoretical 
proximity of the terrorist, fanatic, violent, and intolerant Muslim with the dreadful, conspirator, 
outrageous Jew. Although different and not fully overlapped, racisms fed by these figures share the 
same classical racial morphology and the same authoritarian and fascist syndrome well known in 
European history [10].  
The difference is that in recent years the new Islamophobia has replaced in the prejudiced social 
imaginary, as regards distribution, grounding and virulence, the old Antisemitism, to the point where it 
should be compared to hostility against the Roma, perhaps the most stigmatized and racialized subject 
around the world. The folk devil represented by the Muslim—and in smaller measure the Jew—is, in 
this view, a figure of collective anxieties and fears, a scapegoat which nourishes the racist and fascist 
conviction that only cultural, religious and racial purity can stem the breakdow n of social order and the 
collapse of society [11]. This kind of anti-Muslim prejudice is a process in which Muslims—but also 
Roma, Blacks, Jews, Asians—are seen as a threat to the purity and order of the nation and its ethnic 
fabric, a nation imagined as a cohesive community. In this way, the racism we are facing is liquid, 
transitive, highly mobi le, generically oriented against all foreigners. Following the Sivanandan definition, 
we are witnessing the rising of a new racism, called ‘xeno-racism’ [12]. This anti-foreignness sentiment, 
this fear of strangers means at the same time the defence and preservation of “our people”, our way of 
life, our standard of living, and our “race”. “If it is xenophobia, it is—in the way it denigrates people 
before segregating or expelling them—a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism, except 
that it is not color-coded. It is xeno-racism: a feature of the Manichaean world of global capitalism, 
where there are only the rich and the poor—and poverty is the new black. The rhetoric of demonisation 
is racist, but the politics of exclusion is economic: a prelude to creating a peripatetic underclass of 
international Untermenschen”. 
After the September 11, this xeno-racism has been directed against Muslim communities even 
though they have been settled in Europe for decades, and are European born citizens. They do not 
merely threaten Europe as the “enemy within” in the war on terror; their adherence to Islamic norms 
and values threatens the notion of Europeanness itself. Under the guise of patriotism, a wholesale  
anti-Muslim racism has been unleashed which itself threatens to destroy the fabric of the multicultural 
society [13]. Undoubtedly specular to this process, some Muslims tend to construct a polarized  
world-view opposing the Islamic ummah and the West, the latter seen to be led by a Jewish-American 
conspiracy [11].  
It is this ubiquity that makes this racism working as a social bond for scared and isolated  
people inside Western societies, yet not only in these latter. It asks for subordinated assimilation and 
instantly recognizable inferiorization of Others, putting them on the last rung of an imaginary social 
ladder. This desire to subordinate the Other is strictly linked with the authoritarianism, which is 
embracing not only Italian society. Here lies the thrust towards coercive assimilation, through the 
adoption of a number of measures, which include the recasting of citizenship laws according to 
security considerations; the introduction of compulsory language and civics tests for citizenship 
applicants; codes of conduct for the trustees of mosques; a cultural code of conduct for Muslim girls 
and women who, in some areas of Europe, will be forbidden to wear the hijab in state schools and 
other state institutions. However, all these obl igations are inscribed in the frame of an insurgent 
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authoritarianism and European ethno-nationalism. As has been stressed by different authors, all 
modern nation-states seek to reduce differences to a majoritarian conceived unity. In this way 
majorities can feel ‘possessive about the country for democratic, historical and other reasons and insist 
that the definition of national identity should reflect their privileged status. The implication we draw 
from this concern is that the inclusion of minorities within nation states must necessarily negotiate a 
potentially coercive “othering” tendency [14] (see also [15]). 
The second model of anti-Muslim racism is something new. This kind of racism not only blames 
the single Muslim or the single domestic settled community, the single fundamentalist who lives next 
door, the single body which bears intolerable cultural and religious symbols (flags, graves, hijab), but 
the entire civilization which produced and shaped him. Is this generalization so decisive at the point to 
render Islamophobia a unique and different form of racism quite unlike that of familiar racialization of 
Roma, Blacks, Jews, or Asians? Are fears leading to Islam-phobia really so different from those 
driving to Jew-phobia or Roma-phobia? As suggested by Theo Goldberg, ‘Islam is taken in the 
dominant European imaginary to represent a collection of lacks: of freedom; of a disposition of 
scientific inquiry; of civility and manners; of love of life; of human worth; of equal respect for women 
and gay people’ ([10], p. 345). The guilty party here is the Muslim civilization, which is producing and 
reproducing anomic and anonymous violent guys, broadly global networked to tear up the social fabric 
of Western democratic societies. The Islam is bringing inside Europe death, on the fear of which, as 
pointed out in a very brilliant way by Goldberg, Hobbes so heavily rested the motivation to (Euro-) 
modernity’s social contract. Not individual Muslims, not even Muslim communities, but the collective 
Muslim, his ancestry civilization and legacy, has come to represent the threat of death. Islam is become 
the monster of our times, our collective nightmare, the paranoia of Europe’s cultural demise, of 
European integrity. In this view Islam appears as the epitome of traditionalism, pre-modernism, the 
enemy of modernization and globalizing democracy, the bearer of tyranny, despotism, and absolutism. 
From here, the unavoidability of the clash between Western and Islam. In this perspective, as noted by 
Iqbal, first Orientalism appeared as a fruitful perspective to study Islam and its relations with other 
civilizations [6]. Then, in the same wake, came Huntington’s thesis that a new cold war would take 
place not on the basis of economics or politics, but based upon culture and civilization marked by 
epistemic orders and religions. 
3. Public Anti-Muslim Discourse: Some Evidence from Italian Case 
The Italian case presents both these perspectives. Undoubtedly, the Italian case appears in certain 
ways anomalous if compared to the rest of Western Europe. The specificity of Italian Muslims comes 
from the great number of their countries of origin, the speed of the settlement, their scarce or  
sporadic visibility in public space, the fragmentation of their circles, and the weakness of their 
representativeness in front of public institutions [16,17], in spite of their significant presence being 
equal to 2% of total population. 
The reasons for the quick rise of anti-Muslim public speaking considering the early stages of  
Arab-Islamic immigration are manifold [17,18]. The issue of immigration in Italy faces a historic 
period of profound changes in social, economic, and politics. The early 90s witnessed the collapse of 
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the old political system and the emergence of new political forces—such as the Northern League and 
Forza Italia—whose populist nature has long been analyzed and studied [19–22]. 
The racist party the Northern League was the key carrier of explicitly anti-immigrants and anti-Muslim 
positions, promoting both public discourses and national and local governance practices [20]. In his 
discussion of the Italian variant of populism, Laclau notes that the Northern League has moved 
increasingly into a ‘theory of the enemy’ endorsing the idea that if a radical change had to happen the 
social field had to be split in two [23].  
Over time, the Islamophobia of Northern League gained radical forms of mobilization against the 
construction of Mosques in some major cities of the northern regions in which are concentrated the 
majority of immigrants. According to some observers, the turning point occurred in a small town near 
Milan, w here the granting of land for the construction of buildings to be used as a place of worship for 
the Islamic community unleashed an Islamophobic campaign fiercely reaching extremes, including the 
invitation to sprinkle the ground with the urine of ‘Padanian’ pork. The mobi lization against the 
mosques by the Northern League is undoubtedly a paradigm in building the “internal enemy” and to 
endorse logic of social antagonism. The partial, but significant support of local citizens is the outcome 
of this emphasis on foreignness. 
The legitimacy of an anti-Muslim public discourse aimed at building the internal enemy has  
found support from some influential intellectuals, opinion-makers and members of the Catholic  
clergy [24–27]. After September 11, the most widely read and important Italian newspaper, Corriere 
della Sera, published a long article by the noted novelist Oriana Fallaci, entitled ‘The anger and the 
pride’. The article is an openly racist invective against Muslims (Muslims ‘breed like rats’, ‘we have 
no place for muezzins, for minarets, for false teetotallers, for their fucking Middle Ages, for their 
fucking chador ’), where she complaints the softness of the West in the confrontation with Islam 
portrayed as the contemporary absolute evil, a new Nazi-fascism (see [24]). 
In 2001, she published a book with the same title of the article [28]. Translated into major 
languages, it became a sensational bestseller, with more than one million copies sold, reflecting a 
creeping and a growing consensus in public opinion toward the xenophobic and anti-Muslim arguments 
developed by Fallaci. Her next book, also, published in 2004 and entitled ‘The Force of Reason’, became 
a bestseller. Confirming her former extremist thesis she evokes the risk that the higher birth-rate of 
Muslim immigrants can transform Europe in ‘Eurarabia’ [29]. In 2006, a few months before her death,  
Oriana Fallaci was interviewed by The New Yorker, an event that contributes to international 
resonance to her anti-Muslim fundamentalism, stressing the comparison of Islam with Nazism and 
Fascism, the impossibility of dialogue and urging destruction of a mosque: 
‘They want to build damn mosques everywhere.’ She spoke of a new mosque and Islamic center 
planned for Colle di Val d’Elsa, near Siena. She vowed that it would not remain standing. “If I’m 
alive, I will go to my friends in Carrara—you know, where there is the marble. They are all anarchists. 
With them, I take the explosives. I make you jump in the air. I blow it up! With the anarchists of 
Carrara. I do not want to see this mosque—it’s very near my house in Tuscany. I do not want to see a 
twenty-four-meter minaret in the landscape of Giotto. When I cannot even wear a cross or carry a 
Bible in their country! So I BLOW IT UP!” [30]. 
A special case concerns the political scientist Giovanni Sartori, professor emeritus at the Columbia 
University in New York and at the University of Florence, columnist for the Corriere della Sera and 
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intellectual of the center-left. His essay ‘Pluralism, multiculturalism and foreign’, published in  
2000 [31], shows an unambiguous reasoning that is configured as an explicit model of ‘academic 
Islamophobia’ [26]. On the one hand he proposes the essentialist representation of the Islamic religion 
as dogmatic, intolerant and marked by fanaticism; on the other hand, he focuses on the compatibility of 
Islamic immigrants to our ‘cultural tradition’. In a passage of the essay he shows this qualitative leap 
that opens up a very problematic horizon about the possible integration: 
‘I’m wrong, for example, to argue that the immigrant Muslim is for us the farthest, the most alien 
and therefore the most difficult to integrate? If I’m wrong no one has shown me it. But not even I 
mistake in claiming that Muslim immigrants are fundamentalists at all’ (cited in [26]). 
The invectives of Fallaci and the erudite reflections of Sartori serve up to the Italian conservative 
intellectual and political class a significant Islamophobic trend, reinforcing the political logic of 
building the internal enemy. Pulled by this rhetoric, a larger Islamophobic vision takes hold in Italian 
racist landscape, investing the entire Islamic civilization. The first case regards Magdi Allam, a 
Muslim who recently converted to the Catholic faith with much fanfare, for years deputy director of 
Corriere della Sera and influential commentator on Islamic issues. In an article published in 2005, 
before his conversion, entitled ‘Mosque-mania: need a stop’, he calls, by virtue of his being a secular 
Muslim, for the suspension of the construction of mosques as they ‘generate the brainwashing that 
turns human people into death’s robots’ [32]. The narrative used sustains the stereotype of the Muslim 
potential terrorist and of the Imam as a preacher of hate towards the West. This discourse is clearly 
oriented against the Islamic fundamentalism that provides for ‘well-founded’ fear that unites honest 
Muslims and Italians’. 
The second one regards Marcello Pera, another well-known intellectual who moved from 
philosophical relativism to the conservatism by election in Italian Parliament with Berlusconi’s party, 
Forza Italia. He published, in February 2006, a Manifesto called ‘For the West, Force of Civilization’ 
which, in total harmony with the clash of civilizations paradigm emphasizes the spiritual and moral 
crisis of the West incapable of responding to the challenge of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism 
and ‘the commitment to reaffirm the value of Western civilization as a source of universal and 
inalienable principles, contrasting in the name of a common historical and cultural tradition, any 
attempt to build a Europe alternative or opposed to the United States’ [33]. 
This is still the case of an intransigent rhetoric defending Western values against Islam, only show n 
in its fundamental dimensions, and interweaving both with the exaltation of Christian civilization and 
the negative image of the Italian left guilty of hating our civilization and handing it over to Islam, of 
being lenient with countries and terrorist groups and of being in favor of multiculturalism. Here, the 
image stemming from these neo-conservative positions is that of the global threat, of the invasion 
perpetrated by the terrifying world of Islam. These examples of intellectualism clearly hostile to  
Islam and its embodi ment in the Muslim migrants pose a significant question: the formalization of a 
model of thought that nourishes a prejudiced common sense targeted against Islamic otherness  
and multicultural society (see also [24]). What unites these various interventions, before and after 
September 11, is an a-critical view of Islam seen as a single monolith, incompatible with the principles 
of democracy and freedom, very close to the differentialist thesis of the Samuel Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations. The question is whether this representation in Italian public opinion has had a consensus, 
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or if there are less hostile views to Islamic civilization than forms of prejudice connected to the 
proximity and visibility of Muslim migrants. 
4. The Two Latent Dimensions of Islamophobia 
Data collected by the survey show that the double dimension of Islamophobia above mentioned is 
well rooted. In fact the distribution of frequencies among the single items of Islamophobia scale 
reveals this double nature of anti-Muslim prejudice (Table 1): on the one hand, we note that public 
opinion is scared by the Muslim in ‘flesh and blood’; on the other hand, people feel threatened by an 
entire and historical civilization. For the largest part of the sample, Muslims are intolerant, fanatical,  
anti-modernist, strongly closed in themselves, with a clear and powerful identity, scarcely loyal to the 
country in which they live, barely committed against terrorism. From the other side, Muslims are seen 
under the light—negative or positive—of their civilization, of the weight of culture and intellectual and 
scientific life in European tradition. 







Muslims are not very tolerant  19.41 11.05 21.40 48.14 100 
Islam is a religion too traditional unable to 
adapt to these times 
16.68 9.11 21.34 52.88 100 
Muslims prefer to associate with members of 
their group in isolation from other  
18.95 9.08 21.30 50.67 100 
Muslims are more loyal to their  
country of origin than to the country in  
which they live  
14.35 8.76 19.43 57.45 100 
Islamic religious leaders are doing too little to 
fight terrorism  
11.86 7.43 22.72 57.99 100 
Islam is a threat to Christian civilization  47.61 10.54 15.82 26.04 100 
Islam is a religion that has many values in 
common with our  
33.28 14.60 20.39 31.72 100 
European culture is superior to Islamic culture  54.65 11.03 14.03 20.29 100 
It’s right that we build places of  
prayer for Muslims  
22.52 4.82 12.80 59.85 100 
The contribution of Islamic intellectuals to 
European culture was important  
16.30 10.38 23.86 49.46 100 
In this double perspective, some data illustrate how widespread is the typical representation of 
Muslim as a subject that expresses great distance from our lifestyles and values. For example, the 
closure of Islamic communities and their loyalty to the country of origin is a tangible sign of the 
plausibility of the discourse on the difficulty of integrating Islamic immigrants to Italian society. 
Some others illustrate that Islam considered in its overall dimension of civilization arouses more 
positive feelings. In fact, there is a polarization between two positions: one that does not feel 
threatened by the Islamic civilization, believes that Islamic culture was important for European culture 
and, above all, that it is not inferior to ours and is able to convey values similar to the ourselves; vice 
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versa, a second position expresses a high level of incompatibility and the perceived threat of Islamic 
civilization. Moreover, positions regarding the construction of mosques confirm this ambivalence. 
Only a clear minority expresses its oppos ition to the Mosques building, outcomes that show how  
protests and mobilizations manipulated by the Northern League involve only a livid minority. This 
distinction is confirmed by the factorial analysis of the Islamophobia scale, which shows two separate 
factors in line with what is stated on the analysis of frequencies of individual items 1
Here the problem is to understand the nature of this polarization, which shows also diverging  
rates of hostility: the first dimension records more hostility than the second one. We can affirm that the 
first indicator is more able to represent attitudes against Muslims as ‘internal enemy or threat’. The 
second indicator recognizes Islam as an “external and threaten enemy” and it is less shared by Italian  
public opinion. The first dimension appears strongly supported by the negative image of Muslim 
individuals and communities as visible elements bearing an irreducible cultural distance; conversely, 
when Islam is considered in its cultural and religious dimension that image weakens. We can say that 
Islam in its version of the “clash of civilizations” breaches the conservative political side, which in turn 
shows preference toward authoritarian and ethnocentric attitudes that are impor tant in shaping the 
racial prejudice. 
 (Table 2). The 
first dimension or indicator consists of those items related to the aforementioned characteristics of 
closeness, intolerance, traditionalism, and anti-modernism holding hostile attitudes towards Muslims 
considered a homogeneous group negatively defined, while the second factor evokes feelings 
regarding Islamic culture and religion in its generality, belief that results in less prejudice than the 
previous one. The items forming these two separate dimensions are quite homogeneous, except 
perhaps for two sentences that might be deemed dissimilar: item 2 (Islam is a religion too traditional 
unable to adapt to these times), and item 9 (It’s right that we build places of prayer for Muslims). The 
explanation for this apparent discrepancy may be of both a statistical and cognitive nature. From a 
statistical perspective, if we remove those two items, outcomes of factor analysis are the same, namely 
the significance of the two groups does not change. On the cognitive level, we can say that respondents 
may have understood the questions in the same direction as here emphasized. The charge of 
conservatism against Muslims could be used as the explanation for certain events associated with 
patriarchal customs (such as the killing of young women who wanted to marry an Italian guy) or with 
external signs brought by Muslim people such as the Hijab of Muslim women. In this view, conservatism 
does not refer to an abstract dimension but to the concreteness of everyday behavior of subjects 
considered Muslims. The item on mosques is perhaps one of the most discussed in literature. The 
substantial agreement of the sample with the sentence is interesting because it shows a degree of 
religious tolerance likely depending on the fact that Islam is a legitimate monotheistic religion with a 
long history. Here, we don’t find discomfort for the building of a mosque, but the adherence to a 
principle of religious freedom, which is well adapted to the second dimension of Islamophobia that  
we detected.  
 
                                                 
1 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is large 0.889, and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is 
0.000. These results indicate that is reasonable to proceed with factor analysis. 
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Table 2. Factor Loading for anti-Muslim Attitude Scale *.  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
The Muslims are not very tolerant  0.63458  
Islam is a religion too traditional unable to adapt to these times 0.62955  
Muslims prefer to associate with members of their group in 
isolation from other  
0.63217  
Muslims are more loyal to their country of origin than to the 
country in which they live  0.63911  
Islamic religious leaders are too little to fight terrorism  0.66359  
Islam is a threat to Christian civilization   0.57038 
Islam is a religion that has many values in common with our   0.63287 
European culture is superior to Islamic culture   0.51231 
It’s right that we build places of prayer for Muslims   0.64210 
The contribution of Islamic intellectuals to European culture it 
was important  
 0.71217 
* (Cronbach Coefficient Alpha: factor 1: 0.70; factor 2: 0.67). 
The responses (Table 3) were then reclassified on four classes or scores through a uniform system 
of allocation of points in which higher scores were expressing Islamophobia. This re-classification has 
allowed us to identify four clusters of attitudes (see for another interesting classification [34]): 
(1) tolerant 
(2) indifferent/neutral 
(3) loyal with prejudice 
(4) intolerant 
These categories try to capture the different and often ambivalent feelings, which are at work 
among people. We use the term ‘tolerant’ in a way very close to Michael Walzer [35]. For him, 
tolerant people are those who have no difficulty making room for men and women whose beliefs they 
do not accept, nor try to imitate their practices; people living with otherness whose presence in the 
world they approve of, but which still remains an element far from their experience. Among tolerants, 
we include of course even those who enthusiastically endorse the differences we might call 
‘xenophile’. Tolerants are mainly people with a good level of education and center/left position. 
The terms indifferent/neutral combine two types of social distance identified by Bogardus [36]. The 
pattern of indifference and neutrality is based on the absence of social contacts with members of other 
groups, on a permanent separation from those racial groups that they do not understand, on the lack of 
(positive or negative) emotional reactions. No new experience can change their alleged neutrality and 
indifference to the other groups. Here, people with higher education level and positioned at the 
center/left of the political spectrum are more likely neutral. 
The loyalist model comes from a strong sense of loyalty to the belonging “racial” community, 
which often hides the vices and defects of the members of their same group, thus, creating an 
immutable social distance [36]. A complex of overestimated superiority leads many people to attitudes 
of superiority towards the less fortunate races. Behaviors of prejudiced paternalism characterize  
this type of person, especially if their social status is not threatened by the “inferior races”. Here we 
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may note that high, medium, and low levels of education are equally represented, while center-right 
positions are generally more widespread than the center-left.  
The intolerant model comes from a combination of different but homogeneous attitudes: a sense of 
superiority; the belief that the other races are intrinsically different and alien; the idea of having an 
exclusive right in certain areas of privilege and advantage, and the fear and suspicion of the 
subordinate races full of projects in order to weaken the prerogatives of the dominant race [37]. Here 
people with lower education level and positioned at the center/right are more likely intolerant. 
Table 3. Frequencies level of Hostility against Islamics (%). 
Tolerant 4.77 
Indifferent/neutral 16.36 
Loyal with prejudice 40.75 
Intolerant 38.12 
Total 100.00 
At the general level, we may assert from the point of view of main socio-demographic  
variables (age, gender, cultural capital, and class) that older people have more widespread negative 
attitudes than younger ones, and education plays an important role: the lower the cultural capital is, the 
more often the attitude is negative; gender is not so meaningful, while anti-Muslim feelings are equally 
distributed among all social classes. In general a greater openness to Islam by young and well-educated 
people is confirmed. 
A particular importance regards the influence exerted by political affiliation on racial  
prejudice. People that express an orientation toward the center/left are more tolerant than those 
oriented to the center/right. These latter confirm their hostility toward both the internal dimension of 
threat and the external one connected with the “clash of civilization” syndrome. However it should be 
noted that an impor tant part of the center-left political orientation (34% of sample) agrees intolerant 
attitude concerning the “internal threat” indicator, although it is tempered by a greater openness on the 
second indicator.  
5. The Overlapping between Islamophobia and Antisemitism 
Our idea is that we are facing a racism that changes easily its targets reproducing a well-know n 
morphology. It is confirmed by the fact that the 45% of the sample cultivates simultaneously prejudice 
against Muslims and Jews. This idea pays a tribute to Robert Fine argument sustaining that recently 
there has been a “methodological separatism” in the field of racial and ethnic studies, which split the 
study of Islamophobia, Antisemitism, and other kind of racisms in different and often oppositional 
areas [38]. It is a remarkable outcome of our survey the identification of a strong connection between these 
two kinds of racism, as noted in other researches [39]. Meer and Modood argue that there are impor tant 
analogies in the racial content of Antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment or Islamophobia [14,40].  
A comparison of Antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment could promise novel insights not only into 
our understanding of both, but also into the interpretation of the widely racialized dynamics which 
embrace our multicultural societies. This strong similarity and overlapping of Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia (see Table 4) should be explained by the plastic nature of the new racism. Jews and 
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Muslims, although with differing percentages, are targets of a single racial prejudice, characterized by 
indifference to its victims and an alarming transitive property that makes it move easily from one 
target to another. We face the emergence of a public racist discourse that sees the bearer of different 
symbols and beliefs, the “otherwise” Italian or European, a threat for the majority cultural homogeneity 
and for the sense of group position. Almost 45% of our sample expresses attitudes against Jews and 
Muslims, while only 15% is tolerant. Furthermore the 65% of those who show anti-Muslim feelings 
are at the same time anti-Semitic, while 91% of those who show anti-Semitic attitudes are at the same 
time anti-Muslim.  
Table 4. Frequencies overlapping hostility against Jews and Muslims. 
 Frequencies % 
Pro Jews, Pro Muslims 223 14.66 
Against Jews, Pro Muslims 99 6.47 
Pro Jews, Against Muslims 520 34.12 
Against Jews and Muslims 681 44.75 
Total 1523 100.00 
One might call this phenomenon an ‘indiscriminate discrimination’ or a ‘systemic and generalized 
racism’ or again as we have, ‘liquid racism’. The overlap between the two forms of prejudice suggests 
some thoughts. On the one hand it shows that, at least in this country, prejudice and racism unfolds  
along similar and symmetrical models. The two groups are perceived hostile based on similar 
characters. Both groups are considered closed, little tolerant, loyal to foreign countries, especially 
traditionalist and immutable. Of course, nobody denies them a place to pray, just as their contribution 
to European culture it is not in discussion. But both are undergoing a process of essentialization or 
racialization. Secondly, one can see that the two groups are not perceived as actors of a conflict where 
one or the other may have reasons on their side to justify their mutual animosity. Unlike those who 
think that judgments on the two groups are fuelled by polarized ideologies—something that is confirmed 
for 40% of the sample and probably for reasons that go beyond the ideological tensions produced by 
the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis—60% expresses similar opinions on both groups. 
It may be noted here that in history waves of racism occur which change their target from one group 
to another. Antisemitism is a historical form of racism so elaborate that it constitutes a model for the 
racialization of other groups. Racism against Muslims shares the same pattern of anti-Jewish racism, as 
it would appear that anti-Romaism, which is becoming the prevalent racism, spread on the basis of a 
model once more similar to that forged by Antisemitism.  
Finally, as noted by some anthropologists, Jews and Muslims share, in the light of detractors, some 
dystonic and opposing attitudes towards globalizing modernization, such as preferences for food 
processed on the basis of principles of worship, for religious and traditional garments, for more or less 
esoteric and secret traditions, and the fact of being monotheistic religions in competition with 
Christianity. All aspects that cast over the two groups, at least in this country, a shadow of prejudice 
and vilification. 
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6. Predictors for Antisemitism and Islamophobia  
In the social-psychological and sociological research different prediction models of racism are used. 
Dekker e van der Noll [5] used for example as a predicting model of prejudicial attitudes a combination 
of three processes: direct contact, socialization and attitudes’ self-generation through inference 
processes (see also [41]). In the case of Zick, Küpper and Wolf [42], the focus was on the Group-focused 
Enmity syndrome and the predictors were six different elements: anti-immigrant attitudes, Antisemitism, 
anti-Muslim attitudes, racism, sexism, and prejudice towards homosexual persons. 
Differently from these researches, we tested a more classical model based on ideological 
dimensions, which however entail behavior and practices. Our research design was based from the 
outset on the idea that the intolerant conduct, in this case against Muslims and Jews, is dependent on 
other components of the system of beliefs, attitudes and practices of social actors. This viewpoint was 
first tested a high level of reflection and empirical research by Adorno, Levinson and colleagues in the 
famous research on authoritarian personality. Usually, this system of ideas is called ideology, but this 
term, since its coinage, has changed over time gaining multiple and divergent meanings. Some 
scholars, reviewing the dimensions of ideology, gave to the concept a twist of cognitive nature that 
makes it a more useful and high rank research tool. A cognitive angle was also present in the research 
of Adorno and colleagues: in the Introduction it is said that “ideology is the term used in this volume in 
the common meaning in current literature, under which it designates an organization of opinions, 
attitudes and values a way of thinking about man and society” ([43], p. 18). But their interest was 
primarily oriented to explaining the correlations between ideology and individual personality, whereas 
the latter factor mediates the sociological influences on ideology and attitudes. Some components of 
the ideology that influence the racist views and attitudes have long been believed by social scientists to 
be those of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. To these two predictors we have added one further 
explanatory variable, used repeatedly in research on racism, but more structural and situational, which 
we call anomie. 
According with these underlying assumptions, research shows that racism is the result of three large 
collective phenomena or conditions that mark Italian society: 
• A widespread ethnocentrism and nationalism, which seems to feed a strong national or regional or 
ethnic identity is present in a large proportion of respondents. We argue that the ethno-national 
identity is a circumstance that favors the occurrence of prejudice. At the same time and in a 
recursive or circular logic, the anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim prejudice contributes to national unity 
in a classical dynamic based on the identification of a threatening out-group.  
A widespread authoritarianism, which is a reaction to anxieties and insecurities both individual and 
collective. Under conditions of particular uncertainty and social fragmentation, authoritarianism 
becomes a flight “from freedom” and from the individual and collective responsibility; it crystallizes 
in punitive attitudes and an obsessive request for compliance. In the same recursive perspective first 
outlined, authoritarianism enter into a relationship of “reciprocal causality” with prejudice, making 
this latter a functional substitute for the social and juridical covenant that should ensure social 
harmony and social cohesion [44]. Racism is, thus, not only the source for new social ties, but also a 
tool to deal with the crisis of the rule of law. Here lies the thrust for the drive towards assimilation.  
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• A widespread situation of anomie, or social uncertainty and distrust, which feeds the prejudice and 
produces the conditions for racism, is the starting point for new forms of social solidarity, backed 
now on an aggressive but short-lived ethno-racial identity. In this case we have split up anomie in 
two diverging dimensions: distrust of the future and distrust of society, alluding the former to a 
condition of complete uncertainty toward the near upcoming individual and familiar condition; the 
latter referring to a contingent situation of absence of social supports and solidarity. In all three 
cases there is clear evidence that the lower the cultural capital and social status, the stronger the 
authoritarian, ethnocentric and distrust attitudes. 
In our research we tested the strength of these three predictors (Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism, 
and Anomie), made from its scales, with the aid of path technique based on multiple regression 
analysis which helps to determine the direct and indirect impacts of certain independent variables on 
dependent variables in a hypothetical causal system. From the multiple regressions, coefficients are 
obtained that indicate the strength of this effect, called beta coefficients. 
Authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, which are highly correlated (+0.61), explain clearly the 
intolerance toward Muslims and Jews. The more one is authoritarian and ethnocentric, the greater is 
one’s level of intolerance towards Muslims and Jews (β coefficient = 0.27 and β = 0.28). In this model, 
the distrust of the future is not in a significant causal relationship with intolerance because it is 
mediated by the other two indicators, with which it is strongly correlated: +0.45 with authoritarianism 
and +0.41 with ethnocentrism. 
From the presentation of the various diagrams showing the direct and indirect effects of the three 
main predicting variables of the model we can make some evaluations. First, the authoritarian attitude 
proves to be a decisive factor in shaping negative opinion of Jews and Muslims, in line with several 
other research studies. Even ethnocentrism reinforces the injury due to the high correlation between 
these two variables. Undoubtedly, expressing opinions of an authoritarian model easily connects to the 
emergence of attitudes that favor  a pos itive vision of subjects’ own hegemonic group identity.  
In the sociological dialectic between in-groups and out-groups, such attitudes are often the result of a 
series of historically specific social circumstances, which increase the flow. In other words, the 
relationship between authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, intolerance, and prejudice against Muslims and 
Jews should not lead us to think in terms of specific personality, but rather to reflect on the current 
social and economic situation of our society and how it promotes the emergence of these attitudes, 
especially in those people that belong to the right of the political spectrum. Anomie has no direct  
effect on intolerance, it is nevertheless a condition that feeds an authoritarian and ethnocentric 
perspective, which provides “good reasons” and structural conditions for the occurrence of  
prejudice and racism. In essence, anomie acts as carrier of resentment that feeds on the legitimacy of 
authoritarian and ethnocentric reasons. 
It is however important to note (Figures 1 and 2) that the two predictors considered—authoritarianism 
and ethnocentrism—act on prejudice against Jews and Muslims in a different, if not completely 
opposite manner. In the case of Antisemitism, authoritarianism turns out to be less important than 
ethnocentrism, thus revealing a nationalist prejudice fed by a special sense of irreducible distance 
between cultures. In the case of Islamophobia, authoritarianism prevails instead in the causal relation, 
confirming, as argued earlier, that prejudice against Muslims is more closely linked to a sense of social 
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disorder, to the feeling that people of Islam religion are in themselves threatening or dangerous. 
Authoritarianism is a syndrome embraced especially by the lower class. It is likely that the social 
frustration generates growing demands for conformity, justicialism, hierarchy and control of outsiders. 
Authoritarians claim for a well-ordered society where “others”, here identified with Muslims, must 
occupied their fated social position avoiding any voice for rights. Ethnocentric people feel Jews as 
high-level competitors bearing privileges naturally stemming from ethno-national origin and belonging. 
Insofar as Muslims are seen as a threat of natural social order and so are matter of hierarchy,  
Jews are felt as competitors belonging to another but privileged ethnic minority and so are matter of 
national loyalty. 
Figure 1. Path between Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism, Distrust in the future and 
Intolerance towards Jews (R-square = 0.18). 
 
Figure 2. Path between Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism, Distrust in the future and 
Intolerance towards Muslims (R-square = 0.15). 
 




The research here summarized casts a glance on the pervasiveness of prejudice in Italy, a 
phenomenon that is often underestimated, if not entirely denied. The firm denial that racist attitudes 
exist poses a double problem: on the one hand, this denial takes the form of self-exculpatory 
behaviours considered limited to minority racially or ideologically extreme situations that may also 
justify certain attitudes, and second, that denial is a proper strategy which, by denying the evidence of 
harmful policies, speeches, statements, does not openly violate the order of public discourse, which 
obviously is not racist. The latter strategy generalizes the classical assertion that individuals use to 
excuse themselves from guilt: ‘I’m no racist, but...’, and surreptitiously undermines the anti-racist 
public discourse. 
This research illuminates a reality consisting of deep-rooted and pervasive hostile attitudes targeted 
both toward minorities such as Jews, which we believed had vanished from the ideological horizon of 
the citizens of democratic societies, or to new internal enemies that can be identified in Muslims. 
These prejudices have grown slowly over the time, scarcely contrasted, supported by coarse, but clear, 
discourses and ideologies, diffused by media and by, so called, “political entrepreneurs of racism”. 
Furthermore, this trend has grown on the basis of widespread authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and 
social distrust, which mark these collectivities expressing fear of the future and living (or feeling) a 
deeply socio-economic uncertainty. Feelings of fear and distrust find in racism and prejudice a “safety 
valve”, especially among popular classes, and people with scarce cultural resources, who are more 
vulnerable facing a generalized political and economic crisis. The collected data show some further points:  
• In the horizon of the new racism Antisemitism has to be understood as racism, perhaps as the 
archetypal form of the new differentialist racism.  
• Antisemitism and Islamophobia have to be considered as the same family of racial prejudices. 
Obviously different in some aspects, they however share a long sequence of similarities 
regarding the folkways evoked and the discourses subtly di ffused.  
• Behind the term Islamophobia are two different but correlated dimensions, the first leading to a 
“phobia” which easily transforms into racism discriminating against Muslim individuals and 
communities, the second leading to a hostility against Islam as civilization which is older in  
its features. 
• Racism is becoming not only a widespread but disorganized and confused arrangement of 
prejudicial attitudes. It is becoming something more structured, something that we can call a 
social bonding in order to substitute different forms of social organization such as the rule of 
law or class solidarity and cohesion. 
The data here commented on ask unavoidable questions mainly to anti-racist people, because they 
show how anti-racism, mainly because of an irresistible trend of ideological reproduction, is almost 
totally ineffective in curbing racism. The current anti-racism has become a pale replica of the great 
mobilization and critical skills that marked the years immediately following World War II, when the 
racism to be fought was much more evident on both the ideological and political sides, consisting of 
the extermination Jews, Gypsies, and other minorities. The current racism that hides behind 
phenomena such as social insecurity, or at the back of discourses such as the authenticity of cultures 
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and their natural hierarchies, is very different from the explicit racism of the early twentieth century, 
but it is quickly becoming a common sense, which is already part of the public discourse. To combat it 
we need thin and insightful tool s, able to deconstruct the self-evident argument as to who is racist and 
to pierce the veil of ignorance that envelops the racists—“by choice” and “by chance”—and the  
anti-racists who want to fight them. More appropriate then, would be a more courageous and 
compelling critique of the political ideologies and institutional practices that often fuel hostility. 
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